Presidential Candidate Andrew Yang Has Quantum Encryption Policy
At least one presidential candidate has a policy about quantum computing and encryption.
It has two basic planks. One: fund quantum-resistant encryption standards. (Note: NIST is already doing this.) Two, fund quantum computing. (Unlike many far more pressing computer security problems, the market seems to be doing this on its own quite nicely.)
Okay, so not the greatest policy—but at least one candidate has a policy. Do any of the other candidates have anything else in this area?
Yang has also talked about blockchain: ”
“I believe that blockchain needs to be a big part of our future,” Yang told a crowded room at the Consensus conference in New York, where he gave a keynote address Wednesday. “If I’m in the White House, oh boy are we going to have some fun in terms of the crypto currency community.”
Okay, so that’s not so great, either. But again, I don’t think anyone else talks about this.
Note: this is not an invitation to talk more general politics. Not even an invitation to explain how good or bad Andrew Yang’s chances are. Or anyone else’s. Please.
quantumguy • July 12, 2019 7:20 AM
Hi Bruce, I understand your skepticism, this sounds a lot like tech-buzzword sales pitch that you often hear around. However, this time I’m aligned with the position about quantum. Namely, all 3 points that are identified as “problems” I believe are real:
1) Our current encryption standards protecting sensitive national security and banking data, among other types, will one day be decryptable in a short time period.
2) Other countries are currently collecting encrypted information from us that they will one day be able to decrypt.
3) Other countries are developing powerful quantum computing technology at a pace that could outstrip our own capabilities.
I work in the quantum security area (like, both consultancy AND academic work) and the general consensus is that, maybe not tomorrow, maybe not in 5 years, but eventually quantum will be around. “Eventually” used to mean “a looong time in the future”, but we now believe that this is not going to be the case. True, maybe there are more immediate and pressing problems in cybersecurity to be solved, but nothing prevents addressing these at the same time as well.
Notice 3 things:
A) problem 2) above is serious. Even if quantum computers arrive in 50 years, the fact that they will allow to decrypt currently stored information might be troublesome for certain kind of data (think of genomics and diplomatic cables)
B) problem 3) above does not necessarily have to do with security. Arguably, quantum computers will be commercially successful in solving real-world problems in chemistry, physics, finance, etc., way before they become a threat for cryptography. So, being ahead in that field is important.
C) there is a general mainstream view that quantum computers will slowly progress in capability until a point where they will start to look like maybe going slightly closer to approaching the point of being vaguely interesting for minor cryptanalytic purposes. Nobody seems to consider the scenario where a single breakthrough discovery turns QC from “can factorize 15” to “can break RSA 4096” in a matter of weeks. But this scenario might be very real: once we manage to realize a single error-free logical qubit (sort of a qubit that self-corrects over time), then we solve the main obstacle in scaling up a quantum circuit (decoherence), and then universal fault-tolerant QC is basically at hand.
This is not, by any mean, an endorsement of the above mentioned presidential candidate.
Just my 2C